groups using a Biological Species Concept is, for conservation reasons, often preferable to splitting groups using a Phylogenetic Species Concept. Note that such a role for social, political or conservation values, which was also highlighted in GC's comment, in no way threatens the objectivity of taxonomy, as it only concerns the choice between various species concepts, and not how these concepts are applied or whether these groups actually exist. Indeed, this role for values is very far removed from the 'wishful thinking' in the Lysenko-era when claims were accepted not on the basis of evidence, but merely because they were in line with a particular ideology. In other words, as long as concerns about "conservation, economic significance, or politic agenda" (Thomson et al., 2018, 7) are restricted to an appropriately restricted role, they need not threaten the scientific character of taxonomy and can even play a positive role.
Second, if we accept that some extent of researcher bias is inevitable in species delimitation, then it is reasonable to strive towards making such bias as explicit as possible. As this bias is usually part of methodological choices and the choice of species concepts, it remains implicit in much current taxonomic work (see Schlick-Steiner et al. 2010 ) and hence goes unnoticed. GC's proposal of centrally regulated taxonomy would force such bias to be made explicit, and, more importantly, would generate explicit debate about it among taxonomists. For example, in some cases false positives might be more harmful than false negatives or vice versa, while in other cases it is better to suspend judgment about the evolutionary independence of a lineage. While such decisions about the harmful consequences of different kinds of error are now made on a case-by-case basis by taxonomists, often without debate, central regulation of species-level taxonomy would force explicit debate and reflection.
Third, and finally, there are good reasons to install a centralized authority to organize and guide these debates. While there is an important place for special-purpose classifications of organisms, species classification aims to be all-purpose. Such an all-purpose classification should take into account the interests of all stake-holders. Thus, if there are multiple viable options, and values play a role in choosing between these, then the interests of all stakeholders should be taken into account. A centralized authority organising debate between and input from these different stakeholders would be in a good position to ensure this is the case. In light of the worries of Raposo et al. (2017) and Thomson et al. (2018, 8) , who claim that regulation and fixation of species delimitation go against the "dynamic nature of taxonomic progress", it is worth pointing out here that such centralized regulation is importantly dissimilar from the regulation that characterized Lysenkoism. While in the latter, debate was not tolerated and dissenting scientists could end up in the Gulags, a centralized authority as proposed by GC would encourage and organize debate and arguments from all points of view. Moreover, central regulation of species classification need not imply that whatever rules are selected cannot be criticized, adapted, and fine-tuned in continued scientific debate.
To illustrate my points, a brief analogy with the measurement of physical quantities will be helpful. While measurement is different from species delimitation in various respects, there are multiple interesting similarities here. In line with GC's proposal about species classification, the definition, modification and calibration of measurement units are regulated by a central authority, namely, the Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (International Bureau of Weights and Measures). Moreover, it is generally accepted that practical considerations and value-judgments play some role in the choice of measurement standards (see Tal, 2016) . Nevertheless, it is clear that these standards are not arbitrary, and do, indeed, play a crucial and particularly fruitful role in scientists' efforts of explaining and representing the world. Moreover, the central regulation of these standards has not limited scientific freedom or stifled progress: the definition of standards changes regularly and is the subject of continuous debate among metrologists. Similarly, the influence of value-judgments on the choice of species concepts and the centralized regulation and guidance of debates about this need not constrain scientific freedom or lead to Lysenko-like threats to the objectivity of species delimitation.
All this does not mean that GC's proposal is necessarily the best solution to the problems they start from. If anything, this is hard to evaluate without a detailed plan of how the proposal is to be developed in practice. As Raposo et al. (2017) and Thomson et al. (2018) point out, there are other viable solutions, such as using alternative management units for conservation purposes or adapting conservation legislation, that seem to avoid some of the severe practical problems of GC's proposal (e.g. adding another layer of bureaucracy, diverting funding from already under-funded taxonomic research, etc.). It may be that these solutions are more efficient than GC's proposal. However, it may also be that GC's plan turns out better. The point here is that worries about values and restrictions to scientific freedom should not stop us from further investigating its merits and potential.
